“It is fortunate that the majority of the injuries sustained were not serious. In fact, the police would have been justified in using AEPs earlier,” he said.
The Police Ombudsman investigation of the event gathered all relevant documentation from the PSNI, as well was all available video footage from fixed, mobile and helicopter cameras, including from police and military. Investigators also obtained recordings of all police radio transmissions made during the course of the incident.
Enquiries were made with the local hospitals and letters were sent to community leaders in North Belfast asking for any assistance that they might be able to provide.
From the weight of material gathered, investigators were able to piece together a picture of events that evening.
The Ardoyne roundabout is an interface that had seen a high level of public disorder over a number of previous years. The passage of Orange Order ‘feeder parades’ and their supporters along the shop fronts in the area had proved contentious. That year the Parades Commission made a determination that three Orange parades could pass the shops.
Police planning for the event was structured: a ‘Gold’ commander was in charge and gave the authority for the use of AEPs. This officer was supported by a ‘Silver’ Commander, who in turn was supported by a ‘Bronze Commander.
At approximately 19:49 hours that evening the Orange Order parade began to pass the Ardoyne Roundabout. A number of missiles were thrown at the marchers and their supporters. Police gave a warning that water cannon would be used, but this had no visible effect and the throwing of missiles continued. The water cannon was then deployed and police moved the rioters back into Brompton Park. By 19:53 hours, the parade and its supporters were clear of the shop fronts.
A number of blast-bombs were thrown, causing injuries to members of the public and police officers.
But large-scale disorder broke out a short time later, with the police being attacked with masonry, bottles and petrol bombs. A number of blast-bombs were thrown from the rooftops of the shops, causing injuries to members of the public and police officers.
By 20:31 hours, the Silver Commander was informed that the lives of police officers were at risk, that police could not disengage immediately, and that the water cannon was not full. This information was accompanied by further for requests authority to deploy AEPs. A blast bomb then exploded at the roundabout area, seriously injuring two men, one of whom was a police officer.
Examination of records kept by the Gold Commander show that at this point he gave ‘general authority to fire AEP against identified blast bombers on roofs of shop fronts.’ AEP teams were then deployed to the shop fronts.
Police believed there were two unexploded devices in the area.
Further authority was then requested for deployment of AEP rounds in the area of Brompton Park, where the rioting was concentrated. It was reported that an officer had been injured and could not be moved and that police could not withdraw from the scene. Records also show that police believed there were two unexploded devices lying in the area and that lives were at risk.
At 20:42 hours, the Gold Commander gave authority to deploy AEP teams to deal with the Brompton Park threat, but also gave instructions to continue using the water cannon, where possible. He recorded that he granted authority as police were unable to get under cover, were unable to extract themselves from the area and that the water cannon was ineffective.
A warning was then given which can be clearly heard on police video, telling the crowd to disperse or AEPs would be used. This had no noticeable effect and at 20:47 hours the first of 21 AEP rounds was fired. The final round was fired at approximately 21:58. The rioting continued until 22:20 hours.
Dr. Maguire said that he found no evidence of misconduct of the part of any of the police officers:
“Before they considered using AEPs, police had tried other options to ease the tension in the area and quell the subsequent rioting. Officers were deployed on foot and later in vehicles to keep the rival factions apart. The crowds were given verbal warnings to disperse. As the evening progressed, a water cannon was used. None of these tactics had the desired effect.
By this stage the police were under attack from blast bombs, petrol bombs, heavy masonry, golf balls and other missiles. They found themselves in a life threatening situation and were unable to withdraw or to take cover,” he said.
15 separate requests for permission to deploy AEPs before authority was granted. Ten of these requests came after the first blast bomb was thrown.
Analysis of radio transmissions show that 15 separate requests were made by police on the ground for permission to deploy AEPs before Gold Command gave authority. Ten of these requests came after the first blast bomb was thrown.
Dr Maguire said he believes the police would have been justified in using the AEPs earlier:
"Requests made via the Silver Commander had to be referred to Gold Commander which caused an element of frustration for the police units ‘on the ground’ who were seeking a quick decision. This led to delays in the critical decision making process which may not have been present had authority rested with the Silver Commander.
Following this incident the PSNI reviewed their policy for the Belfast Region and as a result the authority to deploy AEPs is now with to the Silver Commander for pre-planned operations” he said.