The Police Ombudsman has concluded that the RUC investigation into the 1989 murder of John Devine was ‘seriously defective’.
In a report published today (12 June 2025), Police Ombudsman Mrs Marie Anderson, highlights a series of failures, concluding that a man prosecuted for Mr Devine’s murder almost three decades later, should have been arrested and interviewed as a suspect at the time.
She is also critical of the wider suspect and arrest strategy, which resulted in police taking action against only two people on a list of 36 persons of interest, despite intelligence and other information which linked individuals to the murder.
The report identifies that house-to-house and witness enquiries were not adequately pursued and led to missed opportunities to gather evidence which may have assisted police to identify suspects or open up lines of enquiry, and that all available forensic opportunities were not fully exploited.
The investigation also found no evidence that the RUC alerted Mr Devine to the fact that his date of birth had been linked to the name John Devine, in a document found in two separate loyalist paramilitary intelligence caches.
Although the document contained a different address and photo, the police did not consider the potential risk presented to Mr Devine, including whether a ‘threat to life’ warning was appropriate.
“Given the available evidence and other information gathered during my investigation, I consider the original RUC investigation to be seriously defective, and not capable of leading to the identification of those responsible,” said Mrs Anderson.
The murder
On Sunday 23 July 1989, at approximately 2:00pm, Mr John Devine, a married father of three, was murdered in his home at Fallswater Street, Belfast.
Mr Devine and his 13-year-old son, Sean, were alone in the house, when armed men entered through the front door and shot him a number of times at close range. He died at the scene.
Two men believed to have been involved had booked a taxi from a depot in Carlisle Circus, which took them to Richview Street, off the Donegall Road. When they arrived, they asked the driver to park near an alley which led to the Empire Social Club. A third man got into the back seat, put a gun to the taxi driver’s head, and told him to get out. The men then used the stolen taxi to drive to Mr Devine’s home.
Mrs Anderson acknowledged that the RUC investigation of the murder was conducted at a time when policing resources in Troubles-related incidents were stretched and under significant pressure in a year when 81 people died.
Handling of pre-incident intelligence
The Police Ombudsman found that there was no specific intelligence available to police that, if acted upon, could have prevented the murder of Mr Devine.
However, on two occasions, the RUC recovered information from loyalist paramilitary intelligence caches which included personal details that could have been directly attributed to Mr Devine.
The first document was recovered by police during a search in Bellevue Street off the Shankill Road on 1 September 1987, and referred to a ‘John Devine’. Although the date of birth on the document matched Mr Devine’s, the corresponding address and photograph were not his. This document was found by Police Ombudsman investigators during a search for relevant police material at Grosvenor Road PSNI Station.
The same document was among firearms, ammunition, and documentation recovered by police from a house in Rockview Street in south Belfast on 6 October 1988. A number of these seized documents subsequently formed part of the Stevens Inquiry and were attributed to Brian Nelson.
“This information linked Mr Devine’s date of birth to the name John Devine. The Stevens Inquiry not only suspected that this information was being used for the purposes of targeting republicans but also that some of the information was derived from the security forces, thereby indicating an illicit source of such personal information.
“My investigation found no evidence that John Devine had been advised of the potential threat to his security, or that police gave consideration to the potential risk it presented to him, including whether a ‘threat to life’ warning was appropriate.
“The Devine family have confirmed that they had no knowledge of police alerting John Devine to this threat.”
The possibility that Mr Devine may have been a victim of mistaken identity was considered by the RUC investigation team, although there are no records within the investigation papers which clarify the outcome of any related enquiries.
A police officer at Mr Devine’s inquest also referred to the potential for the murder to have been a case of mistaken identity, and confirmed that police did not believe that Mr Devine had any connection with the republican movement. Mr Devine’s family have also refuted that he was involved with any paramilitary organisation.
Suspect and arrest strategy
During the course of the murder investigation, police created a list of 36 persons of interest and files were created for each of them.
Police Ombudsman investigators researched every person on the list and found no recorded rationale as to why they were included, although it was evident that police suspected the individuals were either members of, or connected to, loyalist paramilitaries, including the Red Hand Commando in ‘The Village’ area of Belfast.
Person 1
Person 1 was one of the 36 suspects on the list and “ought to have been treated as a suspect in the murder of Mr Devine” according to Mrs Anderson.
He had been named in intelligence received by RUC Special Branch in late July 1989 as the person who sanctioned the murder. This intelligence, along with further intelligence reports identifying Person 1, was passed to the murder investigation team by Special Branch.
One of these pieces of intelligence stated that Person 1 was responsible for the murder, and that he had threatened Mr Devine after a physical altercation between them at a coal yard in April 1989. The intelligence report concluded that Person 1 was a member of the Red Hand Commando (RHC).
Following the murder, police received similar information from identified members of the public that Mr Devine had had an argument with Person 1 at a Belfast coal yard, where Mr Devine had punched Person 1. Information was also received that the two men initially ‘fell out’ after Mr Devine had refused to stand for ‘God Save The Queen’ at the end of a coal yard Christmas party.
The available RUC investigation papers included a list of the individuals who attended the party. However, the police did not interview all those who attended, including Mrs Devine, about the incident.
Other pieces of intelligence linking Person 1 to Mr Devine’s murder were marked as NDD ‘not for downward dissemination’ and the Police Ombudsman’s investigators found no record that this intelligence was shared with the investigation team.
Despite being in receipt of intelligence and other information that referred to a dispute between Person 1 and Mr Devine, he was interviewed by police as a witness, not a suspect, in August 1989. He informed police that he was not involved in Mr Devine’s murder and declined to make a statement. No further action was taken in respect of him.
“I am satisfied that, given the available evidence, intelligence, and information, grounds existed for the arrest of Person 1 at that time. This would have allowed police the opportunity to interview him under criminal caution and gather evidence that could have either eliminated him from their enquiries or further advanced the investigation into Mr Devine’s murder.”
Persons 2 and 3
Police action was taken against only two people on the persons of interest list, Persons 2 and 3.
Person 2 was regarded as a suspect in the investigation into the material recovered in Rockview Street, which included the document referencing a John Devine.
That operation had been referred to the Stevens Inquiry. The inquiry was commissioned in September 1989 by the then RUC Chief Constable Sir Hugh Annesley to investigate allegations of ‘collusion’ in Northern Ireland between loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces.
Stevens Inquiry officers believed that Person 2 bore a strong resemblance to one of the photofit images circulated after Mr Devine’s murder and passed their views to the murder investigation team. Person 2 was subsequently arrested under terrorist legislation in early December 1989. He denied being involved in the murder, and was subsequently released without charge.
Person 3 had been added to the list of 36 persons of interest after Special Branch received intelligence in July 1989 that a RHC unit from ‘The Village’ murdered Mr Devine and named two of the individuals involved. This intelligence was shared with the murder investigation team, who established that one of the named individuals was Person 3.
Police identified the other individual as Person 8, but Police Ombudsman investigators found no record of any further enquiries being conducted by police in respect of him and he was not added to the list.
Person 3 was subsequently arrested in January 1990 as part of the Stevens Inquiry which had carried out further forensic examinations of a number of items seized at Rockview Street. He refused to answer any questions put to him by police, including those relating to Mr Devine’s murder.
Persons 4, 5, and 6, also on the Devine murder persons of interest list, were also arrested and charged with offences relating to Rockview Street.
Other suspects
In late July 1989, police received an anonymous phone call from a man providing the surname of Mr Devine’s murderer and the road where he lived in Belfast. Although police traced the telephone call to a public payphone on the same road and obtained a list from local police of individuals with the same surname, Police Ombudsman investigators could find no record of enquiries and the surname did not feature in the list of 36 persons of interest.
Similarly, another anonymous caller provided the first name of an individual, whom he stated resembled the photofit image shown as part of a TV appeal, and specified the area of south Belfast where he lived. The murder investigation team identified two persons of interest with the same first name, who were both associates of Person 2. Additional enquiries conducted by police in respect of these two individuals could not be identified and they did not feature on the list of 36 persons of interest.
“My investigators have been unable to establish the rationale as to why individuals linked to Mr Devine’s murder by intelligence and other anonymous information were not treated as persons of interest.
“There are also examples of non-dissemination of intelligence by Special Branch to the murder investigation team. This may have deprived the Senior Investigating Officer of the opportunity to develop new or further lines of enquiry.
“It would be more than twenty years before Person 1 was charged as a result of interviews he gave to researchers at Boston College, Massachusetts as part of an oral history of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland”.
Boston Tapes
The prosecution of Person 1 for the murder of John Devine largely hinged on admissions he made during a series of tape recorded interviews that became known as the ‘Boston Tapes’. However, he denied being the person on the tapes.
Upon reviewing the contents of the relevant interviews, the PPS directed that Person 1 be charged with 19 criminal offences believed to have been committed between 1973 and 1996, including the murder of John Devine on 23 July 1989. He was charged with aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the murder of John Devine. It was alleged that, while not one of the gunmen, he had sanctioned it as leader of the Red Hand Commando
The trial of Person 1 in Belfast was delayed by issues regarding his fitness to stand trial, and by the coronavirus pandemic. Person 1 died on 1 December 2023, and consequently, the criminal proceedings against him ended.
Other investigative failings
The report also identifies a series of other investigative failings.
Scene management and forensics
Six fingerprint marks were recovered from Mr Devine’s front door, three of which had sufficient detail to be compared against the fingerprints of the potential suspects. A comparison was carried out against only three people, including Person 2. All three comparisons proved negative.
Fingerprint marks from the murder scene were not cross-referenced against ten fingerprints which had been recovered from the stolen taxi used in the murder.
These ten fingerprint marks were compared against 17 of the 36 people on the persons of interest list, and a further two individuals. All 19 comparisons proved negative. However, the investigation found no record that comparisons were carried out with the remaining 19 people on the persons of interest list.
Elimination fingerprint marks were not collected from family members, with the exception of Sean Devine, or from residents, ambulance personnel, and police officers who entered the house following the murder.
No consideration was given to forensically examining cigarette butts and wood shavings found in the stolen taxi, and the taxi depot at Carlisle Circus from where two of the men involved in the murder ordered the taxi, was not identified as a scene by police and was not forensically examined.
“I am satisfied that the failure to fully exploit all the available forensic opportunities evidenced an incomplete police investigation. A more thorough forensic strategy may have gathered important evidence that could have been used by police to connect potential suspects to the murder,” said Mrs Anderson.
House-to-house enquiries and witnesses
House-to-house enquiries were conducted in Fallswater Street, where Mr Devine lived, and in the surrounding streets.
These enquiries identified a number of witnesses who were subsequently interviewed by police. However, the investigation found no record that follow-up enquiries were conducted at addresses where residents had not been available.
House-to-house enquiries did not take place in the Broadway area, which was the ‘getaway’ route taken by the gunmen, or around Carlisle Circus, from where the taxi used by the gunmen was booked.
The Police Ombudsman is critical of the gap in the investigation caused by the failure to make follow-up visits or to conduct enquiries in the Broadway and Carlisle Circus areas:
“These locations, if visited by police, may have uncovered potential witnesses who could have provided descriptions or opened up additional lines of enquiry,” she said.
Two witnesses, who were identified as a result of house-to-house enquiries, had been working at a house in lveagh Street at the time of the murder, and saw the stolen taxi leaving Fallswater Street.
Police Ombudsman investigators traced and interviewed one of the men, who stated that although he had told a police officer what he saw and provided his contact details, police did not contact him and he never made a witness statement.
A house-to-house questionnaire showed that another witness standing outside a shop in Iveagh Street told police he had seen a car with three people in it driving away from the scene and could describe one of the men. There was no record in the police documentation that a statement was recorded.
Similarly, despite an action being raised to take a statement from another witness who had been in Mr Devine’s house following the attack, Police Ombudsman investigators found no evidence the statement was recorded.
The Empire Social Club, close to where the third man involved in Mr Devine’s murder was picked up, was also a source of potential witnesses. Police identified one witness who saw this man outside the Club, and interviewed a member of staff.
Police also seized the club’s membership register and established that over 100 people were on the premises during the period of time the taxi was stolen. They subsequently interviewed five of these people but the Police Ombudsman found no record that witness statements were obtained from them, or anyone else who was in the club.
When Police Ombudsman’s investigators reviewed the register, they found that a number of the 36 people on the persons of interest list had links to the club, although none of them were listed as having been in the club on day of the murder.
“The three men who murdered Mr Devine were unmasked and a number of witnesses were able to provide descriptions. These were used to develop photofits, one of which led to the identification of Person 2 as a suspect, and the RUC investigation team also had photo albums compiled.
“However, statements should have been taken from all relevant witnesses, as their evidence may have assisted police in identifying and apprehending those responsible for Mr Devine’s murder,” said Mrs Anderson.
Missing records
The unavailability of police documentation has been identified by the Police Ombudsman as a recurring systemic issue in historical investigations which has hindered investigators from “capturing a full picture of RUC murder investigations”.
“The absence of records in this case has hampered my investigation,”
said Mrs Anderson.
“Without the suspect photograph albums, police officer notebooks and journals or the policy log, it has not been possible to establish what consideration was given to the information provided to the investigation. My investigators could not establish why only two individuals were interviewed under criminal caution about the murder.
“There is no evidence of a rationale for police treating Person 1 as a witness when he ought to have been treated as a suspect and interviewed under criminal caution. This is a matter of concern for me given the available intelligence and information linking him to the murder.”
Allegations of collusion
In his complaint to the Police Ombudsman, Sean Devine, said the issues he raised ‘point towards a feeling of hostility towards my father by members of the security forces which could provide a reason for the lack of activity; an even less generous view would be that there was some collusion between some members of the security forces and the murderers.’
He also said:
“My belief is that for operational, political, or more sinister reasons, my father's murder was at best not investigated in a professional or thorough manner and, at worst, there were elements within the RUC that actively thwarted such an investigation.”
Person 1, when interviewed by a researcher as part of the ‘Belfast Project’ stated that, from the late 1980s onwards, loyalist paramilitaries were receiving intelligence from members of the security forces that was then used for targeting purposes. He stated that this was ‘collusion’ but it was being carried out by individual members of the security forces and was not a co-ordinated organisational issue. He stated that the intelligence was detailed, accurate, and was ‘coming in left, right, and centre…like confetti.’
Mrs Anderson said:
“Although the family have complained about collusion between the security forces and those who murdered Mr Devine, I am not permitted to express a qualitative view of my own on this issue, as to whether collusion/collusive behaviours have occurred in any case, in consequence of a recent High Court judgment.
“The detailed narrative outlined in the public statement of the circumstances of Mr Devine’s murder must be read in the context of that judgment and in light of my obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention to provide an independent and fulsome investigation of the family’s complaints.”
Family Contact
One of the family’s main concerns centred on the lack of contact with, and updates from, the murder investigation detectives, leading to the sense that the family was not important to the enquiries.
Police Ombudsman investigators reviewed the available police documentation and found minimal information relating to police updating Mr Devine’s family about the progress of the investigation.
Mrs Anderson noted that this was a systemic issue identified in many other cases.
She said family liaison in 1989 was significantly different from the current service provided to bereaved families, and pointed out that the modern concept of family liaison had not been established until several years later.
However, the witness statement recorded by police from Mrs Devine consisted of two sentences, a fact which the Police Ombudsman viewed as “wholly inadequate even by the standards of the time.”
“Mrs Devine held significant information about her husband and in a murder investigation, the family will often have information about the victim that can assist police in developing relevant lines of enquiry.”
Overall conclusion
In her overall conclusion, the Police Ombudsman said:
“I believe that John Devine was the victim of a campaign of sectarian violence mounted against the nationalist community. Loyalist paramilitaries alone were responsible for his murder. Given the significant failings in the RUC investigation, I believe that Mr Devine’s family were failed by police in their search for the truth regarding the perpetration of his murder.”
The Police Ombudsman thanked the Devine family for their patience in awaiting the outcome of this protracted and complex investigation.