The Police Ombudsman has found that the police investigation of the murder of Peter Gallagher in 1993 was “wholly inadequate” and failed his family.
Mr Gallagher, a 44-year-old father of seven from Toomebridge, was shot and fatally wounded by a loyalist gunman while arriving for work at the Westlink Enterprise Centre in west Belfast shortly before 8am on 24 March 1993.
Mrs Marie Anderson said her investigation of a complaint from Mr Gallagher’s family found that although there were a total of 12 people who should have been of interest to the murder investigation, none were arrested. This was despite some of them being linked by significant, and on occasion corroborative, intelligence and other information.
She also criticised the police decision to cease surveillance of members of the UDA/UFF two days before the murder, given that they had received multiple intelligence and other reports indicating that the group were actively planning attacks.
Within three days of surveillance being paused on 22 March 1993 - when police resources were reallocated in response to intelligence about PIRA activity - the Shankill-based ‘C Company’ unit of the UDA/UFF had murdered Mr Gallagher and, in a separate attack the following day, 17-year-old Damien Walsh.
By the time surveillance of ‘C Company’ members resumed on 30 March 1993, they had also attempted to murder two other people.
“I found no evidence that during this time police had reconsidered their decision to cease surveillance of ‘C Company’ members, despite the murders of Mr Gallagher and Damien Walsh, and mounting intelligence about other planned attacks,” said Mrs Anderson.
However, the Police Ombudsman added that her enquiries had found no intelligence that, if acted upon by police, could have prevented Mr Gallagher’s murder. Neither was there any evidence that security forces provided information to paramilitaries to facilitate the attack.
Mr Gallagher was struck multiple times by shots fired from an area of grass behind fencing overlooking the rear of the Westlink Enterprise Centre, and backing onto the nearby dual carriageway.
The UFF admitted responsibility in a call to BBC, and police quickly received information indicating that the attack had been carried out by members of ‘C Company’.
No one has been convicted in relation to either the murder of Mr Gallagher or of Damien Walsh.
Initial police response
Mrs Anderson said the initial police response to Mr Gallagher’s murder had been appropriate and comprehensive in nature.
A bicycle suspected to have been used by the gunman was found near a footbridge across the Westlink near Roden Street.
A 9mm Browning pistol wrapped in a balaclava was recovered near the scene of the attack, and a scenes of crime examination recovered 10 empty cartridge cases, three bullet heads as well as soil and grass samples.
House-to-house enquiries were undertaken, and vehicle checkpoints were conducted on both lanes of the Westlink the following morning. These enquiries identified a number of witnesses, and a total of over 50 statements were obtained from members of the public, police officers, expert witnesses and medical staff.
On the day of Mr Gallagher’s murder, police conducted searches of the homes of two men. Nothing was recovered during one of these searches, but a number of items were seized during the other - including three balaclavas, a coat with surgical gloves in the pocket, and a plastic bag of clothing.
These items were tested for gunfire discharge residue, with negative results. Tape lifts from the items were also compared against tape lifts taken from the balaclava found at the scene of the murder and from a fence at the same location. No links between the items were established.
However, Mrs Anderson said it was difficult to understand why - as the murder investigation progressed and intelligence and other information coalesced around three primary suspects - they had not been arrested.
Person J
One of those suspects is referred to in the Police Ombudsman’s report to Mr Gallagher’s family as Person J.
He was known by police to be a key figure in ‘C Company’, and he and other members of this unit had been under surveillance by police for several months up to 22 March 1993 - two days before Mr Gallagher was killed.
In February 1993, police obtained intelligence from multiple sources suggesting that Person J had become frustrated by his inability to conduct terrorist operations in west Belfast due to heightened police activity.
Nevertheless, police received numerous indications that he was continuing to plan to murder members of the nationalist community in west Belfast.
He and two others were stopped by police in the Ardoyne area of the city in late February 1993, reportedly while undertaking an operation to identify targets for attack.
Towards the end of the month, he was one of three members of ‘C Company’ seen together at Upper Dunmurry Lane, on the outskirts of west Belfast, where it was believed they were again engaged in targeting activity. One of those with him on that occasion, Person M, is another of the key suspects in Mr Gallagher’s murder.
Acting on this information, police arrested Person J under Prevention of Terrorism legislation and conducted property searches. No weapons were found during these searches, and he was subsequently released without charge.
Days before Mr Gallagher’s murder, police received intelligence that Person J had obtained two handguns, although it was not known where they were being stored.
They also received information about a meeting at Person J’s house on the evening before Mr Gallagher’s murder, attended by Persons J, N, M and two others.
In the hours following the murder, the RUC investigation team were advised by Special Branch of intelligence that Person J had been intending to conduct an attack from near or through a hedgerow, though the location and target were not stated.
Special Branch also received intelligence on 24 March 1993, the day of Mr Gallagher’s murder, that Person J had two days earlier personally conducted planning for an attack at two shops believed to have been numbered 6 and 7. The intelligence stated that they had been converted into a single unit, one of which had shutters.
The intelligence document was not written until 30 March 1993 and was accompanied by a handwritten note wrongly linking it to the Dairy Farm complex where Damien Walsh had been murdered.
“My investigation of police officer conduct relating to the murder of Damien Walsh established that there were no Units 6 and 7 at the Dairy Farm that had been converted in this manner,” said Mrs Anderson.
“However, Mr Gallagher was murdered outside Units 6 and 7 at the Westlink Enterprise Centre. They had previously been converted into a single storage space with shutters. My investigation established, that this intelligence related to the murder of Peter Gallagher and not Damien Walsh.
“It was not disseminated by Special Branch to detectives investigating either murder.”
A day after Mr Gallagher’s murder, a Detective Sergeant contacted the murder investigation team to advise that the murder weapon had also been used in an attack on 17 March 1993, hours after Person J had been released from police custody.
Also on 25 March 1993, police received information that Person J had been left hiding in a hedge by UDA/UFF members who did not return for him. The target and location were unknown, but Special Branch passed this information to detectives investigating Mr Gallagher’s murder in the belief that it might have been the same location where the Browning handgun and balaclava had been discarded following the murder. They also noted that Person J may have left footprints or other forensic traces.
In early April 1993, police received intelligence that a team ‘from the west’ had been involved in Peter Gallagher’s murder, and later that month, further intelligence suggested that Person J had met with another person who was reported to have “sanctioned” Mr Gallagher’s murder.
“I am mindful that intelligence is not evidence but all investigative agencies rely on intelligence to assist in the investigation of crime,” said Mrs Anderson. “Intelligence can provide investigators with new lines of enquiry which may result in subsequent arrests and other investigative opportunities.
“That clearly did not happen in this case. Despite the significant intelligence picture which was developing around Person J, no actions were raised in respect of him during the police investigation and he was not arrested.
“It is my clear view that he should have been.”
Person N
One of the other key suspects in Mr Gallagher’s murder, Person N, was named in two separate pieces of intelligence as having been the gunman who fired the fatal shots.
On the day of the murder, Special Branch received intelligence that Person J’s team was responsible, and had also conducted an attack in Ardoyne the day before. The intelligence stated that Person N had been the gunman in both attacks.
A file containing Person N’s details was added to the murder investigation documentation on the day following Mr Gallagher’s murder, indicating that he was a suspect at this early stage of the enquiry.
In early April 1993, there was further intelligence that Person N was a member of Person J’s team and had shot Mr Gallagher. The intelligence stated that after the shooting he had made his way to Roden Street.
Despite this information, Person N was also not arrested in connection with Mr Gallagher’s murder.
Person M
A car suspected to have been used by UDA/UFF members before and after Mr Gallagher’s murder belonged to another suspect, Person M.
A witness confirmed that the car had been the one she had seen in suspicious circumstances near her home on the night prior to the murder.
Police also received information that, on the same night, Person M had been in the car with Person N near to where Person J lived.
The vehicle was seized by police on 26 March 1993 and examined by a Scenes of Crime Officer, who found no physical evidence to link it to the attack.
“In light of this information, it is my view that police ought to have arrested Person M for questioning in respect of Mr Gallagher’s murder,” said Mrs Anderson.
“It was reasonable for police to seize his vehicle, therefore it follows that police ought to have arrested and interviewed him,” she said.
Halting of surveillance of ‘C Company’
Mrs Anderson said her enquiries had established that members of ‘C Company’ UDA/UFF had been the subject of surveillance for several months during early 1993.
The exact nature of the surveillance was not always apparent given a lack of records and the “poor recollection” of former police officers who spoke to her investigators.
However, the Ombudsman said it was clear that surveillance, used as part of a broader range of overt and covert tactics by police, was impacting on the ability of the UDA/UFF to mount attacks.
“There was an emerging intelligence picture indicating that the UDA/UFF in west Belfast were becoming frustrated by police, had been unable to mount some attacks and been forced to postpone others.”
Nevertheless, Mrs Anderson noted that intelligence available to police during this time provided “a clear indication of the ongoing threat posed by the UDA/UFF in west Belfast.”
“There was intelligence indicating that members of ‘C’ Company were actively pursuing a campaign of violence against the nationalist community in west Belfast during the period leading up to the murders of Mr Gallagher and Damien Walsh.”
Police surveillance of ‘C Company’ was halted on 22 March 1993, when resources were reallocated in light of information about IRA activity. It did not resume until 30 March 1993.
A Detective Inspector told Police Ombudsman investigators that resources may have been deployed to deal with what had been considered to be a more imminent threat with greater potential for harm. He described managing information, resources and workload at the time as ‘like juggling water.’
However, Mrs Anderson noted that in the three days that followed this pause, ‘C Company’ members murdered Mr Gallagher and Mr Walsh, and mounted several other sectarian attacks.
In the same period, police received “multiple pieces of intelligence indicating that Person J and ‘C Company’ were actively targeting and planning assaults against members of the nationalist community.”
“I am of the view that police ought to have considered resuming the surveillance operation during this three day period given the developing intelligence picture, the attacks that were taking place, and the risk of further attacks,” said Mrs Anderson.
Despite this, she said there was no evidence that, at any time between 22 and 30 March 1993, police had reassessed the risks and realigned resources in the west Belfast area to address the heightened risk posed by ‘C Company’.
“I am of the view that the failure to do so provided ‘C Company’ greater opportunity to mount terrorist attacks on the nationalist community, culminating in the murders of Peter Gallagher and Damien Walsh.
“Although the decision to remove surveillance cannot be causally linked to Mr Gallagher’s murder, my investigation established that this decision indirectly contributed to it, by creating an environment whereby ‘C Company’ operated without the levels of constraint previously placed on them by police.
“Police failed to pro-actively address the identified threat posed by ‘C’ Company to potential victims in the nationalist community during this period.”
Loyalist arms importation
Ballistic evidence collected from the scene of Mr Gallagher’s murder confirmed that the 9mm Browning pistol recovered nearby had been used to fire the fatal shots.
Police also established that it had been used in two previous incidents – an attempted murder in March 1993 and a shooting incident in November 1992.
The Police Ombudsman’s investigation established that the serial number for the weapon fell within the range of weapons imported by loyalist paramilitaries in December 1987. Of these weapons, up to 60% of were recovered by police following a surveillance operation in January 1988 – leading to a number of arrests and convictions.
However, at least 63 VZ58 assault rifles and 34 Browning 9mm handguns, as well as ammunition and hand grenades, reached loyalist paramilitaries. These weapons were subsequently used to murder at least 80 people in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
“As reported by my predecessor, Dr Michael Maguire, those responsible for this arms importation included senior members of the UDA, UVF, and Ulster Resistance,” said Mrs Anderson.
“Dr Maguire concluded that there had been a lack of a concerted investigative effort to bring those responsible for the importation to justice. Detectives investigating seizures of weapons linked to the importation were not provided with relevant intelligence.
“I refer to Dr Maguire’s findings that the failure to do so directly impeded subsequent police investigations seeking to bring those responsible for the arms importation to justice,” said Mrs Anderson.
Murder weapon removed from scene by military
The Police Ombudsman also revealed that the Browning pistol used to murder Mr Gallagher had been removed from the scene by a military Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO). A Scenes of Crime Officer (SOCO) who was also at the scene recorded that the ATO had taken the weapon to Girdwood Barracks in Armagh to ‘clear it’.
Later that day, the same SOCO travelled to Girdwood Barracks and took possession of the weapon, which the ATO had packaged and sealed as an exhibit.
Mrs Anderson said her investigation had been unable to definitively establish why the weapon had been taken from the scene by the military rather than by a SOCO.
Consequently, an independent forensic scientist specialising in the examination of firearms and ammunition, was commissioned by Police Ombudsman investigators to examine the weapon. He was asked to consider whether the weapon had ever been altered in any way, in particular by being fitted with a tracking device.
The expert concluded that there was no evidence that such a device had been fitted to the weapon, and added that he could see no way that could have been done without preventing the gun from functioning.
Fragmented investigation
Mrs Anderson also found that there had been a failure by police to pursue evidential opportunities that would have been available to them had they investigated links between the murder of Mr Gallagher and that of Damien Walsh the following day.
“In my view, the connections between intelligence, weapons and suspects in both Mr Gallagher’s murder and the murder of Damien Walsh, together with the proximity of timing and the location of the attacks, ought to have resulted in police linking the two murder investigations,” she said.
“This did not occur. There was a fragmented investigative approach by police, which undermined both investigations.”
Mrs Anderson added that her investigation had found no evidence that the murder of Mr Gallagher had been the subject of “any meaningful review process”. It had not been the subject of a review by either the Historical Enquiries Team or by a Serious Crime Review Team.
Other concerns raised by the family
The Police Ombudsman’s report considers a number of other concerns raised by Mr Gallagher’s family.
These included that police had taken photographs of Mr Gallagher which had ended up in security photo montages used by terrorists. Mrs Anderson said her enquiries found no evidence that photographs of Mr Gallagher had featured in security montages leaked as a result of police actions.
In relation to a complaint that Mr Gallagher’s widow had not been kept updated about the progress of the police investigation into his murder, Mrs Anderson noted that this was a systemic issue identified in many other cases.
She said family liaison in 1993 was significantly different from the current service provided to bereaved families, and pointed out that the modern concept of family liaison had not been established until several years later, as a result of recommendations made by a public enquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence in London in 1993.
Mrs Anderson also responded to concerns that security forces had provided information to Mr Gallagher’s killers, stating: “My investigation found no evidence that the murder of Mr Gallagher was facilitated by information supplied from police, military or intelligence sources, although my remit does not extend to the military.”
In response to concerns expressed by Mr Gallagher’s family that collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces had been a feature in his murder, Mrs Anderson explained that as a result of the judgment of Judge Scoffield on 6 February this year, she was unable to express a qualitative view of her own as to whether collusion had taken place.
Overall conclusion
Mrs Anderson noted that the investigation of complaints about historical matters is challenging due to the passage of time and unavailability of relevant witnesses and documentation.
However, she said her investigators had “gathered substantial evidence and other information during the course of this investigation” and said she was grateful for the co-operation of a number of former police officers who had assisted her enquiries.
In conclusion, Mrs Anderson said: “I believe Mr Gallagher was the innocent victim of a campaign of terror mounted by loyalist paramilitaries against the nationalist community. The UDA/UFF alone were responsible for Mr Gallagher’s murder.
“I conclude, however, that the family were failed by a wholly inadequate murder enquiry and in particular the failure to link the murder of Damien Walsh to that of their loved one.”