

Statutory Report

**Public statement in accordance with Section 62 of the Police
(Northern Ireland) Act 1998**

**PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE POLICE INVESTIGATION
INTO THE FIRE AT THE SEAN DOLAN GAA CLUB,
CREGGAN ESTATE, DERRY / LONDONDERRY
ON 28 DECEMBER 2011.**

1.0

INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 In the early hours of Saturday 28 December 2011, a fire caused extensive damage to the Sean Dolan Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) Club in the Creggan Estate, Derry / Londonderry. Police and members of the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS) attended the scene and conducted an investigation into the cause.
- 1.2 On 3 January 2012, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) referred concerns regarding the effectiveness of the initial police investigation to the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI), for independent investigation, under Section 55(4) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998.
- 1.3 This Public Statement is made in accordance with Section 62 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 and fulfils the statutory obligation to comply with Regulation 20 of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Complaints etc) Regulations 2000.

2.0

CIRCUMSTANCES

- 2.1 In the early hours of Saturday 28 December 2011, members of the Sean Dolan GAA Club locked up and left the premises. A short time later a fire broke out at the clubhouse causing extensive damage to the rear of the building.
- 2.2 The cause of the fire was investigated by the PSNI, NIFRS Investigators, Crime Scene Investigators (CSI) and the Forensic Service Northern Ireland (FSNI). On 29 December 2011, following an initial examination of the scene and CCTV footage from the clubhouse, the PSNI released a statement to the media saying that they were not treating the fire as suspicious.
- 2.3 On the same date, club members also examined the CCTV and found that around the time the fire had started, 'shadowy figures' were visible outside the clubhouse, through a window located in the hallway, adjacent to the kitchen. The footage also showed a number of large bright flashes occurring within the hallway. Concerned that police had missed these crucial observations, the club members contacted their local Sinn Fein representatives.
- 2.4 Sinn Fein representatives and a senior member of the club immediately met with the PSNI District Superintendent at Strand Road Police Station. They relayed their concerns about the CCTV footage and the fact that police were not treating the fire as suspicious. Having listened to their concerns and upon viewing the footage, the District Superintendent directed an immediate re-investigation of the matter.

2.5

The PSNI released a fresh statement to the media, the following day, stating they were now treating the fire as arson.

3.0

INVESTIGATION

- 3.1 On 5 January 2012, the Police Ombudsman commenced an investigation into the initial police investigation regarding the fire at the Sean Dolan GAA Club.
- 3.2 Police Ombudsman Investigators attended the scene accompanied by senior members from the club. CCTV footage from the club and documentation relating to the initial police investigation was thoroughly examined. Statements were obtained from the NIFRS Investigators and the FSNI Forensic Officer who attended the scene. Accounts were also obtained from a number of members from the GAA Club and a number of police officers were spoken to as witnesses.
- 3.3 During the investigation, Police Ombudsman Investigators formally interviewed four police officers regarding potential breaches of the PSNI Codes of Ethics. These interviews mainly dealt with the initial police response; their lines of enquiry; their assessment of the relevant evidence and the level of supervision of the investigation at that time.
- 3.4 **Initial Police Response and Investigation**
- 3.5 The NIFRS informed police of a fire at the GAA Club at 4:17 am on 28 December 2011 and local police crews arrived within minutes. Two officers from the PSNI Criminal Investigation Department (CID), a Detective Sergeant and a uniformed officer, seconded to CID at the time, later attended the scene at 10:18 am.

- 3.6 A senior member of the GAA Club, already in attendance at the scene, stated that he spoke with the two police officers. Police told him that the NIFRS Investigators would be conducting an examination of the clubhouse to help determine the cause of the fire.
- 3.7 The Club member told Police Ombudsman Investigators that when he spoke to the CID officers and NIFRS Investigators, they said the fire had been caused by an electrical fault, as there was no sign of a forced entry or evidence that the fire had started outside and spread inwards. The member stated that he believed police were taking the lead from the NIFRS Investigators.
- 3.8 The member stated that the CID officers and NIFRS Investigators discussed the possible seat (ignition point) of the fire. He recalled enquiring with them if it was possible the fire had started through the roof. He said the NIFRS Investigator informed him this could not be determined as the roof was so badly damaged. The member stated that whilst he pointed out the fact there was ample CCTV footage from inside the clubhouse, it appeared to him an early assumption was being made that an electrical fault was the cause of the fire.
- 3.9 The member recalled that police informed him on 28 December 2011, that no crime was suspected. He stated he immediately challenged this conclusion and asked police to view the CCTV footage before making such an assumption. The member stated that he offered the Detective Sergeant the footage but said this officer was reluctant to take it, stating that there was no evidence the fire had been started maliciously or evidence to suspect a crime. Later that day, another police officer was tasked to seize the footage for examination.
- 3.10 The member stated that the following day, 29 December 2011, he was contacted by another CID officer. This officer was seconded to CID. The

member met with the seconded police officer at the club, along with the same NIFRS Investigators. The member stated that similar discussions took place as the previous day but it was still the belief of the NIFRS Investigators that the fire had been caused by an electrical fault and no crime was evident.

- 3.11 The member stated that he asked the seconded police officer if he had watched the CCTV footage. The officer said he had not, but provided assurances he would view the footage and respond to him.
- 3.12 The member stated that the officer contacted him later that same day and told him he had examined the CCTV footage. The officer said the fire appeared to have started in the upstairs area of the clubhouse and reiterated that police were not treating the fire as suspicious. Two members of the GAA Club collected the CCTV footage from police that afternoon. Immediately following this, the PSNI released a statement to the media advising they were not treating the fire as suspicious.
- 3.13 The club members subsequently examined the CCTV footage and observed bright flashes in the hallway adjacent to the kitchen. The hallway was at the front of the building, well away from the main seat of the fire to the rear. They also saw what appeared to be 'shadowy figures,' outside the window in the hallway, which concerned them. One of the club members stated this was seen within five minutes of viewing the footage.
- 3.14 The club members then contacted and met with two local Sinn Fein representatives, who also viewed the CCTV footage. Consequently, Sinn Fein representatives and a club member met with the Superintendent at Strand Road Police Station where they viewed the footage together. The next day, following this meeting, the PSNI released a further statement to the media that police were now treating the incident as arson. Local media articles reported that the PSNI had made a 'U-turn' regarding their initial assessment of the blaze.

3.15 A new Detective Sergeant was appointed to conduct the re-investigation and police told the club members they would conduct a forensic re-examination with the use of specialist teams. Police, NIFRS Investigators and a CSI re-visited the scene and conducted a full re-examination.

3.16 Following a forensic re-examination of the building, the kitchen area of the building was found to be scorch-marked and extensive damage caused to its roof. A tile on the roof near the kitchen, at the front of the building, also appeared to have been moved. The Detective Sergeant now formed the belief that there were two seats of the fire; an ignition point at the rear of the clubhouse and one in the area of the tile, above the kitchen.

3.17 The club members subsequently told Police Ombudsman Investigators, that upon receiving this new assessment, they formed the opinion that the Detective Sergeant who had initially attended the scene was on “holiday mode,” referring to the fire occurring during the Christmas period, and it was not properly investigated for this reason.

3.18 **Police Ombudsman Investigation**

3.19 Police Ombudsman Investigators interviewed police officers from the Strand Road CID team, including supervisory officers and those officers directly involved in the initial investigation of the fire and who declared it as not suspicious.

3.20 **Initial CID Detective Sergeant**

3.21 The CID Detective Sergeant assigned to the initial investigation, told Police Ombudsman investigators that he had spoken with two members of the GAA Club and the NIFRS Investigators on the morning of 28 December 2011 at 10.18 am. He stated that in order to determine the cause of the fire he relied on the “experts” to point him in the right direction

and police relied on the opinion of NIFRS Investigators at fire scenes.

- 3.22 The Detective Sergeant stated at the initial attendance he did not know whether the fire was accidental or malicious, but said the NIFRS Investigators showed him where the fire had started at the rear of the clubhouse. He told Police Ombudsman Investigators, that in the early stages of the inquiry, he could not recall anyone suggesting the fire was the result of an electrical fault. However, the Detective Sergeant recalled requesting a FSNI Fire Investigator to attend the scene the following morning and club members suggesting that he should examine their CCTV.
- 3.23 During interview, this officer accepted he did not initially seize the CCTV footage, but was later advised by a senior officer to seize it as technically it was an exhibit. The Detective Sergeant ordered that the footage be seized on the afternoon of 28 December 2011. He then viewed it on a small monitor. He stated the footage was not of a good quality but he did observe 'flickering' on the footage and thought this was just a car indicator or something similar outside the clubhouse. He confirmed he watched the footage for only a matter of minutes, believing the NIFRS Investigators would further examine the footage as part of their assessment.
- 3.24 The Detective Sergeant said door-to-door enquiries were not conducted nor did he seek assistance from specialist police departments. He confirmed that he did not conduct a check of the perimeter of the clubhouse and he did not notice a tile on the roof at the front which had been moved. This tile was subsequently discovered during the re-examination.
- 3.25 The Detective Sergeant said that prior to finishing his duty at 4.00 pm he appointed a seconded uniform officer as the investigating officer. He said he briefed the officer for approximately five minutes and advised him to show the CCTV footage to the FSNI Forensic Officer and the NIFRS Investigators. The Detective Sergeant stated, to further assist the officer,

he made an entry on the incident log of the outstanding enquiries to be conducted.

3.26 The Detective Sergeant said he investigated the fire to the best of his ability and had no doubts about the abilities of the seconded officer he appointed to take over the investigation. He described the seconded officer as capable, but acknowledged the finding of the initial investigation was a mistake and this “looked bad” for police.

3.27 CID - Detective Inspector

3.28 The Detective Inspector stated he was on duty performing the role in an ‘acting up’ capacity when the fire was first reported to police on the morning of 28 December 2011. He explained CID were dealing with a number of serious cases at the time and had a mixture of experienced officers, trainee officers and seconded uniform officers.

3.29 The Detective Inspector stated he considered the appointment of a Detective Sergeant and a seconded uniform officer to be sufficient, at the time, until police had gathered more information. The Detective Inspector stated he briefed the Detective Sergeant as to the circumstances and directed him to seize any CCTV footage and interview all relevant members of staff.

3.30 The Detective Inspector stated whilst NIFRS Investigators would normally provide police with guidance and an opinion as to the likely cause of a fire, he would have expected all CCTV to have been seized and examined. He would also have expected house-to-house enquiries to have been conducted and all staff working that night to have been traced and spoken to.

3.31 The Detective Inspector stated he received a briefing from the initial Detective Sergeant around lunchtime on 28 December 2011, who

informed him the cause of the fire was undetermined. He said the scene examination could not be examined until the next day for health and safety reasons but said he maintained contact with the Detective Sergeant throughout the rest of his shift. The Detective Inspector confirmed that he did not attend the scene and when he finished duty on 28 December 2011 the cause was still undermined.

3.32 He explained he was aware the Detective Sergeant was not working the following day, but would have expected the oncoming Detective Sergeant to be fully briefed about the lines of enquiry already undertaken and those still to be completed. He stated the seconded officer who continued the investigation in the Detective Sergeant's absence did a good job in the circumstances. He accepted that this officer should not have been left unaided to investigate the fire, as he been with CID for less than a year. However, the Detective Inspector stated he would have expected the officer to have properly examined the CCTV footage and interviewed all relevant witnesses.

3.33 The Detective Inspector stated whilst there was a clear need for police to be guided by the 'fire experts' in such cases, police officers should form their own hypothesis. He accepted there was an issue with the viewing of the CCTV and acknowledged that the fact no proper external physical examination was conducted initially was also significant. He believed if the NIFRS Investigators had conducted a detailed physical examination of the scene they may have seen that a tile had been moved at the front of the building. He suggested had this been linked to the observations from the CCTV, a different conclusion may have been reached.

3.34 **CID Seconded Investigating Officer**

3.35 The seconded police officer appointed to investigate the cause of fire stated that the Detective Sergeant instructed him to attend the scene the next day and liaise with all the relevant agencies. He stated his briefing

lasted approximately two minutes and said the Detective Sergeant would have been fully aware of his limited experience.

- 3.36 The seconded Investigating Officer stated he felt that his appointment as the investigating officer was quite a lot for someone with no training and no experience in dealing with a fire investigation of this scale. Whilst he had four and a half years service in the PSNI, he had only been seconded to CID for three and a half months and prior to this he was assigned to police response and neighbourhood duties. In his opinion, the investigation should have been dealt with by a more senior or experienced officer given the community sensitivities surrounding the fire.
- 3.37 On 29 December 2011, the seconded Investigating Officer attended the scene and spoke with the two NIFRS Investigators and a local CSI. Once the scene examination was completed, the NIFRS Investigators informed him that the cause of the fire was inconclusive but they believed it to have started upstairs. He initially viewed the CCTV from the club along with the CSI at Strand Road Police Station and subsequent to this, the NIFRS Investigators joined them and they all viewed the footage together. The Officer stated he did not know where to start with a major fire investigation such as this and was strongly influenced by the expertise of the NIFRS Investigators and the CSI.
- 3.38 During interview, the seconded Investigating Officer confirmed that he did not show the NIFRS Investigators and the CSI all of the CCTV footage seized from the GAA Club. Despite there being six cameras in the clubhouse, he had only concentrated on the footage from a camera positioned in the upstairs area of the clubhouse.
- 3.39 Once the CCTV had been viewed, the seconded officer stated the NIFRS Investigators believed the fire had been caused by a defective spotlight transformer in the roof of the clubhouse. The seconded Investigating Officer said he believed that the Fire Service had moved the tile at the

front of the building and he did not question their conclusion. Following this, he contacted a member of the GAA Club and informed them there was nothing suspicious about the cause of the fire.

3.40 The Officer told Police Ombudsman Investigators that the Detective Sergeant appointed to the initial investigation, did not advise him of anything suspicious on the CCTV in the briefing and at no time did the NIFRS Investigators ever suggest the fire was suspicious.

3.41 The Officer confirmed he did not watch the CCTV footage of the kitchen area of the clubhouse. However, he confirmed he was responsible for examining the CCTV in its entirety and acknowledged that he failed to identify the flashes observed in the kitchen and shadows near the window in the hallway. He also confirmed that he failed to conduct a number of other enquiries before he deemed the fire as not suspicious.

3.42 The Officer stated but he did not speak with the CID Inspector during the 29 December 2011 regarding the discussions and deliberations about the cause of the fire. However, he did recall briefing the Chief Superintendent, later that day, concerning the outcome of the investigation.

3.43 He told Police Ombudsman Investigators that he felt under pressure from the media, the community and senior police officers to make a quick decision regarding the cause of the fire. Additionally, he said felt he received little or no guidance from more senior experienced officers and supervisors.

3.44 **CID Duty Sergeant**

3.45 The Duty Sergeant on 28 and 29 December 2011 explained to Police Ombudsman investigators that he was aware of the fire at the GAA Club, having spoken to the initial Detective Sergeant who had attended the scene. He stated the Detective Sergeant did not inform him that he had appointed the seconded officer as the investigating officer for the incident

and he was not made aware of what needed to be done.

3.46 The Duty Sergeant recalled that the Superintendent sought an update on the fire on 29 December 2011. He approached the seconded officer who was watching CCTV footage from the club, at the time, who advised him that the NIFRS Investigators believed the fire was not suspicious. The Duty Sergeant stated he did not ask the seconded officer about any other enquiries as he did not see the need.

3.47 The Duty Sergeant explained that CID were under pressure to provide the Superintendent with an assessment of the fire. He explained that police officers do not have any specific training in relation to fire investigations and rely heavily on the Fire Service for an accurate assessment. He refuted the allegation that he had failed to supervise the seconded officer and the investigation, stating that although he had spoken to the seconded officer a number of times, this officer had raised no difficulties.

3.48 CID Duty Inspector

3.49 The CID Duty Inspector's first documented involvement in this investigation occurred on 30 December 2011, after the District Superintendent had directed that the cause of the fire be re-investigated. At this time, the CID Duty Inspector documented a number of actions that the police investigation should consider during the re-investigation. He was also tasked with conducting a review of the initial police response and investigation regarding the fire.

3.50 The CID Duty Inspector's review, submitted to the District Superintendent, highlighted a number of short comings in the initial police response and investigation. In particular, he recorded that the seconded Investigating Officer in charge of the investigation had minimal experience in fire investigation and had not been involved in the examination of a major fire

scene. He also recorded that the seconded Investigating Officer had no specific Detective training and had not received specific training apart from that given as part of his initial probationer training.

3.51 However, what the CID Duty Inspector failed to point out or record in his review was that he in actual fact was the Senior CID officer on duty in the District on 29 December 2011 during the time the 'inexperienced' seconded officer was primarily in charge of the initial police investigation.

3.52 Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS) Investigators

3.53 The two appointed NIFRS Investigators provided statements to the Police Ombudsman investigation. They attended the scene of the fire on the 28 December 2011 accompanied by the Detective Sergeant. They saw the building to be severely damaged but stated that they did not draw any conclusions as to the cause of the fire at that stage.

3.54 The NIFRS Investigators stated it was agreed with the Detective Sergeant that he would view the CCTV footage and update them regarding its content. Following this, the Detective Sergeant phoned him to say that he had examined the footage and had noticed what appeared to be an indicator flashing outside the building.

3.55 The following day, on the 29 December 2011, the NIFRS Investigators returned to the scene again and met a seconded police officer and a CSI officer. The FSNI Forensic Officer could not attend. They conducted a scene examination and later that day they all met at Strand Road Police Station to view the CCTV footage.

3.56 The first NIFRS Investigator spoken to by Police Ombudsman Investigators stated they were shown footage from a camera in the upstairs bar and function area, where it was believed that the fire had started. He stated whilst he was aware that the previous day the Detective

Sergeant had mentioned the presence of a car indicator light on the CCTV, he forgot to bring this issue up. However, he added that when he asked the seconded police officer if there was anything else on the CCTV, he replied “no.”

3.57 The NIFRS Investigator stated that he believed police had shown them all the relevant CCTV footage of the incident and it seemed to him that police were taking their lead from them. On the basis of what the NIFRS Investigators had observed on the CCTV, they concluded that the fire had been very intense, had caused a lot of damage in a short period of time and that the most likely cause was an electrical fault.

3.58 The second NIFRS Investigator provided a similar account as his colleague. He confirmed that they only watched footage from one camera and that police confirmed there was no other relevant footage. He added that there was a lot of media pressure regarding the cause of the fire given the sensitivity around it. He stated it was only during the police re-investigation, when they had the opportunity to examine all of the CCTV, that footage from the kitchen area led them to the roof at the front of the clubhouse and the identification of a second seat of the fire.

3.59 **Crime Scene Investigator (CSI)**

3.60 The CSI provided a statement to Police Ombudsman Investigators. She stated that when she initially attended the scene, on 28 December 2011, she spoke to the seconded Investigating Officer and a FSNI Forensic Officer. The following day she returned to the scene and received an informal briefing from the same Investigating Officer and spoke to the NIFRS Investigators prior to commencing her examination. She stated her job was to try and determine the cause of the fire and the seconded Investigating Officer accompanied her as she walked around the clubhouse.

- 3.61 The CSI stated that the scene could not be properly excavated for health and safety reasons but that due to the extensive damage in the function room, the forensic examination focused on the rear side of the clubhouse. She stated that this may explain why the tile on the roof, at the front of the building, was missed during the initial examination.
- 3.62 The CSI stated that she initially watched the CCTV footage from the club, with the seconded Investigating Officer on a small monitor at Strand Road Police Station. She said the monitor displayed a number of small windows with footage from different parts of the premises in each one. She said that footage from the kitchen area was playing on the monitor but they concentrated on the footage from the function room and bar area and noted when the last customers left the bar. She stated that two or three minutes after the customers had left the bar she observed a “flash” and a flame come down from the ceiling and the function room then filled with smoke.
- 3.63 The CSI stated they both watched the footage later, again, along with the NIFRS Investigators and in conjunction with their scene assessment they decided that the most probable cause of the fire was an electrical fault; starting in the roof space and moving down into the function room. She added that there had been no-one in the function room since 26 December 2011, therefore, it was unlikely to have been a smouldering ignition.
- 3.64 The CSI further stated there were no signs of a forced entry and no smell of petrol. There were also no items on the ground around the premises like tiles or glass and no evidence to suggest that anyone was near the clubhouse at the time the fire started. She was also aware that the CCTV hard-drive, which had survived the fire, was situated downstairs and therefore all these factors led her and the NIFRS Investigators to conclude that the most likely cause of the fire was electrical. The involvement of this CSI in the police investigation ended on 29 December 2011.

4.0

FINDINGS

4.1 The Police Ombudsman's investigation has examined the initial police response and investigation of the fire at the Sean Dolan GAA Club on 28 December 2011.

4.2 **Finding 1**

4.3 **Police officers with limited or no experience of responding to large scale fire scenes were appointed to investigate possible criminal offences connected to the cause of the fire.**

4.4 The Detective Sergeant, initially appointed as the Investigating Officer, was an experienced CID officer but had no previous experience in attending a fire scene of this scale. Approximately five hours after arriving at the scene of the fire, the Detective Sergeant handed over responsibility for the investigation to an inexperienced seconded Constable.

4.5 This newly appointed seconded Investigating Officer had only four years service in the PSNI and had been seconded to CID for three and a half months, at the time of the incident. The Constable received no specific detective training and had minimal experience investigating large fire scenes.

4.5 **Finding 2**

4.6 **Police conducted insufficient enquiries during the initial investigation into the cause of the fire.**

4.7 In accordance with investigative practice, the Detective Sergeant considered the initial assessments of the NIFRS Investigators and other experts at the scene. However, he failed to conduct basic investigative enquiries such as checking the perimeter of the clubhouse, conducting house-to-house, thoroughly examining CCTV footage, utilizing the District Intelligence Unit or speaking to the initial 999 caller who reported the fire.

4.8 Similarly, the seconded Constable, who preceded him as the Investigating Officer also failed to conduct or progress these basic enquiries to assist the investigation in determining the cause of the fire.

4.9 **Finding 3**

4.10 **Senior officers accountable for the initial police response failed to ensure the investigation was properly handled and appropriately supervised.**

4.11 There was no proper supervision of the initial police investigation.

4.12 Senior officers accountable for the initial investigation provided insufficient guidance and assistance to the inexperienced seconded Investigating Officer who was tasked with determining the cause of the fire.

5.0

CONCLUSION

- 5.1 Police Ombudsman Investigators identified a number of mistakes and errors during the initial police investigation that wrongly led to the PSNI releasing a press statement indicating the fire at the Sean Dolan GAA Club was not suspicious. However, it should be acknowledged that the PSNI, after considering the genuine concerns of the GAA club members, which were supported by CCTV evidence, immediately rectified their initial determination. The following day, the PSNI confirmed publicly they were treating the blaze as arson.
- 5.2 The Detective Sergeant, who initially attended the scene, should not have appointed a vastly inexperienced seconded Investigating Officer to take over responsibility for a fire investigation of this scale. This was a mistake given, that the cause of the fire had the potential to have a significant community impact.
- 5.3 The Detective Sergeant and the seconded Investigating Officer failed to conduct basic police enquiries during the initial investigation. There was no evidence that crucial information arising from the Detective Sergeant's examination of the CCTV, regarding a 'flashing light,' was ever passed to the seconded Investigating Officer.
- 5.4 Whilst police officers are expected to consider the opinions and assessment of Fire Investigation experts, they should form their own hypothesis based on all the available evidence. The seconded Investigating Officer should have ensured that the CCTV footage was properly re-examined and that all relevant footage was provided to these experts. This did not happen. This resulted in missed opportunities during

the initial forensic scene examination and led to an inaccurate assessment being made regarding the cause of the fire, during the initial investigation.

5.5 The Detective Sergeant failed to ensure that the investigation would be properly supervised upon handing over responsibility and thereafter the seconded Investigating Officer received little or no advice and support from more senior officers responsible for oversight of the investigation.

5.6 In conclusion, the initial police response to the fire at the Sean Dolan GAA Club lacked leadership, direction and supervision both in the investigation of possible criminal offences and ensuring public confidence in policing.

6.0

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1 A total of five police officers – two Detective Inspectors, two Detective Sergeants and the seconded Investigating Officer - were recommended for misconduct proceedings regarding their failure to properly investigate and supervise the investigation of the fire at the Sean Dolan GAA Club. These failures constituted breaches the PSNI Code of Ethics.
- 6.2 These recommendations have since been acted on by the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

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POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

DATE: 10 June 2014

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